A recent circular issued by Bangladesh Police Headquarters warning of possible militant attacks on key state installations, allegedly involving dismissed armed forces personnel, should be regarded as a matter of grave national concern. It signals a deeply troubling reality: extremism in Bangladesh is no longer operating only from the margins, but appears increasingly intent on penetrating institutions, shaping influence, and acquiring organized power.
Bangladesh has painful experience of militant violence targeting secular voices, progressive activists, and minority communities. Yet, in many instances, sections of the right-wing political spectrum, including supporters of Jamaat-e-Islami and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, have been accused of downplaying such threats as fabricated or exaggerated. More recently, the interim administration that emerged from the so-called anti-discrimination movement has faced criticism over the visible presence of Islamist militant elements within that movement, alongside allegations of significant ideological influence from Jamaat-e-Islami in state affairs. These developments have intensified fears over the growing normalization of extremist politics within the national structure.
Since the fall of the government led by Sheikh Hasina on 5 August 2024, concerns have deepened further. Bangladesh has witnessed a sharp rise in the release of militants and other high-risk prisoners. In the months following the political transition, large numbers of individuals linked to extremist networks reportedly secured bail, while several high-profile militants and serious offenders were released from custody. Simultaneously, prison unrest enabled thousands of inmates to escape, with many still unaccounted for, including suspected militants.
Taken together, these developments have alarmed citizens, security experts, civil society representatives, and international observers, raising urgent questions about governance, rule of law, and the future stability of Bangladesh.
The Long Accumulation of Neglect: How Years of Political Opportunism Made Room for the Extremist
Bangladesh did not arrive here overnight. The rise of militancy has been building for years through denial, appeasement, political opportunism, and the normalization of violent narratives. What was once treated as a fringe threat has gradually found space to regroup and expand. Whenever violent extremism is treated as a temporary inconvenience rather than a strategic threat, it returns stronger.
The weakening of democratic culture and rule of law has made matters considerably worse. When institutions become polarized, accountability declines, and lawful political participation loses credibility, extremist actors benefit. Disorder creates opportunities for those who reject democracy altogether. Every election rigged, every opposition suppressed, every independent voice silenced pushes more people toward those who offer certainty through violence. Democracy is not simply a voting mechanism. It is the daily practice of accountability, transparency, and trust. Bangladesh has allowed those habits to corrode, and the price is now becoming visible in bomb plots and police circulars.
The Madrasa and the Bomb: How Radical Islam Is Weaponising Sacred Spaces Against a Secular State
Recent reports of a militant bomb plot operating from a madrasa in Keraniganj should add to that concern. According to media reports, militants allegedly used the madrasa as cover to manufacture explosives and plan coordinated attacks across the country. Investigators believe the intention was to spread fear, intimidate law enforcement agencies, and create instability. This is not merely a law and order failure. It is an ideological failure.
Bangladesh was constituted as a secular state. Secularism, in the Bangladeshi sense, was never an attack on faith. It was a promise that no one faith would hold the state hostage. When radical actors use mosques and madrasas as cover for violence, they do not just break the law. They desecrate the very institutions of faith that millions of ordinary Bangladeshis hold dear. The secular compact must be defended not only by the state but by religious communities themselves, who are the first victims of this cynical exploitation.
The Price of Institutional Decay: Why a State That Cannot Govern Itself Cannot Defend Itself Either
The growing influence of Jamaat-e-Islami and other religion-based political forces in public life is also part of this wider debate. Whether through direct politics, ideological reach, or organizational networks, these forces gain ground when mainstream democratic actors fail to offer stability, justice, and public confidence. This should be examined politically and democratically, not ignored or deflected. Good governance is the most effective counter-radicalization program a state can run. When citizens have access to justice, when the police serve the people rather than political masters, when public institutions function with integrity, the space for extremist recruitment shrinks dramatically.
Militancy thrives not because it is persuasive but because governance has failed. When a young man from a marginalized district sees no path to dignity through education, employment, or civic participation, the recruiter waiting at the corner of the madrasa compound suddenly sounds reasonable. The state must understand this not as sentiment but as strategy: investment in good governance is investment in national security.
No Island in the Storm: How Regional Jihadi Networks and Global Radical Finance Are Keeping Bangladesh’s Extremists Alive
Bangladesh does not face this threat in isolation. The militant networks operating within its borders draw from a wider regional and global ecosystem. Funding channels from the Gulf, ideological supply chains from transnational Salafi movements, and operational links to networks across South and Southeast Asia all sustain what might otherwise remain small, localized groups. The Rohingya crisis has added another layer of complexity, with refugee camps serving in some instances as spaces where radical recruiters operate with relative freedom.
Old Ghosts, New Networks: Pakistan’s ISI, the Ideology of 1971’s Losers, and the Long War Against Bangladesh’s Identity
One cannot speak of Bangladeshi militancy without speaking plainly about the Pakistan connection. The ideological roots of organizations like Jamaat-e-Islami lie in the politics that opposed Bangladesh’s liberation in 1971. Pakistani military and intelligence structures have historically maintained links with elements hostile to the Bangladeshi state’s secular and democratic foundations. The idea that Bangladesh should be “corrected”, made more Islamic, more aligned with Pakistan’s vision of the subcontinent, has never disappeared from the margins of regional politics.
Intelligence assessments from multiple agencies have over the years pointed to ISI linkages with radical networks operating in Bangladesh. The use of hawala networks for funding, the ideological training pipelines, and the operational coordination that occasionally surfaces in investigations all point to a sustained effort to keep Bangladesh politically unstable and ideologically vulnerable. This is not a conspiracy theory. It is a documented pattern that successive Bangladesh governments have found politically inconvenient to confront loudly but strategically impossible to ignore. The nation that won its independence against Pakistan in 1971 cannot afford to pretend that 1971 is finished business.
A Call to Conscience-The Republic Must Defend Itself: Fifty-Five Years After Liberation, Bangladesh’s Unfinished Revolution Demands Courage
Bangladesh now stands more vulnerable than it has in years. Protecting the republic requires firm action against militancy, the defense of democratic institutions, sustained investment in education that resists radicalization, and a national unity that transcends partisan division. These are not optional extras for a future government. They are the minimum obligations of the present one.
Militancy thrives when societies look away. The circular from police headquarters, the bomb factory in Keraniganj, the infiltration of state institutions, these are not episodes. They are a warning. The generation that fought in 1971 is passing. The responsibility of defending what they built now falls on citizens, on institutions, on political leaders who must choose between convenient silence and necessary courage. Bangladesh can still reverse this trend. But only through vigilance, democratic renewal, and an uncompromising refusal to normalize the forces that wish to undo the republic. Silence is no longer an option. It never was.
Parvez Hashem, Lawyer and Human Rights Defender
