Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has formally accepted an invitation from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to visit India, signaling a potential reset in relations after a period of strain. However, diplomatic sources indicate that Rahman’s first foreign visit may be to Bhutan—an approach widely interpreted as a cautious balancing act in a sensitive regional environment.
In a letter to Modi, Rahman struck a conciliatory tone, emphasizing shared history and the need for renewed cooperation. “I deeply value your kind reflection on the historic and long-standing relationship between our two countries,” he wrote. “The people of our two countries share considerable commonality and enjoy a deep-rooted relationship.”
He further underscored Dhaka’s intent to “reinvigorate our cooperative engagement” to ensure long-term “peace, harmony, and prosperity.”
A Diplomatic Reset After Political Upheaval
Rahman’s outreach comes at a time of uncertainty in Bangladesh–India relations following the ouster of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. Under Hasina’s leadership, Dhaka and New Delhi had built a close strategic partnership, particularly in counterterrorism, connectivity, and regional stability.
India’s decision to send Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla to Rahman’s swearing-in ceremony was widely viewed as a signal that New Delhi remains open to engagement despite concerns over Bangladesh’s evolving political landscape.
However, analysts note that rebuilding trust may prove challenging, particularly given the historical baggage associated with previous Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) governments.
BNP’s Historical Record and Security Concerns
Relations between Bangladesh and India were deeply strained during BNP-led governments, especially between 2001 and 2006. During that period, Indian security agencies and multiple investigations alleged that insurgent groups from Northeast India operated extensively from Bangladeshi territory.
These groups included the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM), and several smaller militant organizations. Security assessments suggested that insurgents used Bangladesh as a base for training, logistics, and cross-border operations.
ULFA, in particular, was reported to have maintained a significant presence inside Bangladesh, with camps in regions such as Chittagong, Sylhet, Sherpur, and other border areas. Some reports indicated that senior leaders lived in Bangladesh for extended periods and even operated financial networks from urban centers like Dhaka.
Indian officials repeatedly raised concerns that Bangladesh had effectively become a “safe haven” for insurgent leadership. One of ULFA’s top leaders, Paresh Baruah, was widely believed to have operated from Bangladeshi territory during that time, while another leader, Anup Chetia, was eventually arrested in Bangladesh and later extradited to India.
Arms Smuggling and Institutional Allegations
The issue reached a critical point with the 2004 Chittagong 10-truck arms haul—one of the largest arms smuggling cases in South Asia. Investigations and court proceedings later indicated that the weapons were intended for insurgent groups in Northeast India.
The case drew significant attention due to allegations that elements within Bangladesh’s state and intelligence apparatus had facilitated the operation. Senior officials linked to BNP-era structures were implicated, and Tarique Rahman himself was later convicted in connection with the case.
A related ammunition seizure in Bogra further reinforced concerns about organized arms networks operating through Bangladeshi territory during that period.
Analysts and security experts have described the situation as one of “connivance,” suggesting that sections of the state machinery may have tolerated—or even supported—such activities, sometimes in coordination with external actors.
Impact on Bilateral Relations
These developments had a profound impact on Bangladesh–India relations in the early 2000s.
India repeatedly accused Dhaka of harboring militants and allowing cross-border terrorism, leading to heightened security tensions and diplomatic friction. Cooperation on counterterrorism and extradition remained limited, further eroding trust.
For India, insurgent violence in its Northeast—sustained in part through cross-border networks—was viewed as a direct national security threat.
Policy Shift and Improved Ties After 2009
A significant shift occurred after 2009, when Bangladesh adopted a more proactive stance against militancy. Authorities dismantled insurgent camps, extradited key leaders, and enhanced cooperation with India on security matters.
This policy change contributed to a marked improvement in bilateral relations and a decline in insurgent activity in India’s Northeast.
Against this backdrop, Rahman’s current outreach is being closely scrutinized for signs of continuity or divergence from past BNP-era policies.
Bhutan First: A Strategic Signal
The possibility that Rahman’s first foreign visit will be to Bhutan, rather than India, is seen by many analysts as a symbolic move. Bhutan maintains strong ties with both Bangladesh and India, and a visit there could allow Dhaka to project a balanced diplomatic posture while avoiding immediate political sensitivities.
Experts suggest this sequencing reflects a cautious attempt to rebuild regional relationships without triggering domestic or international concerns tied to historical precedents.
Looking Ahead
While Rahman’s letter to Modi signals a willingness to reset ties, the success of this effort will depend on sustained policy clarity and confidence-building measures.
Given the legacy of past tensions, particularly during BNP rule, New Delhi is likely to closely monitor Dhaka’s actions in areas such as counterterrorism cooperation and regional security.
For now, both countries appear to be taking tentative steps toward re-engagement—though the path forward will require addressing longstanding concerns and rebuilding trust that was once deeply strained.
