The Voice

Abhimonyu Faizi

Note: Those without the time to read a lengthy article may refer to the Chart at the end of the article, where we use statistical forecasting methods to compare the BNP and Awami League. It provides an estimate of what might have occurred regarding enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings if BNP had governed for 14 years like the Awami League.)

The situation took a strange turn. In the afternoon, a gentleman from Noakhali, now settled in Comilla, called me and asked, “What do you think about the matter?” I had no idea what he was referring to, so I asked for clarification. He became more excited and said, “You still haven’t realized?” Thinking it might be another disturbing news story, I responded cautiously. The gentleman, growing agitated, criticized my profession and Facebook writings and said, “You people are one-eyed creatures. My leader has done something significant, yet you haven’t praised him.”

I soon realized he was talking about Tareq Rahman, as he was a known die-hard BNP supporter. But I was unaware of any recent developments. I admitted my ignorance (a little white lie) and asked him to explain. Delighted, he relayed the news.

Apparently, Tareq Rahman had recently claimed during an iftar gathering that he had also been detained in the infamous ‘Aynaghar’ (Mirror Room). According to my friend, this statement benefited the Awami League, which infuriated him.

The report from Bangla Tribune, titled “Many of us were tortured in Aynaghar: Tareq Rahman,” quoted Tareq Rahman saying, “I never told you this before. A few days ago, the chief adviser of the interim government visited Aynaghar, where he met Hummam Quader Chowdhury. Hummam later told me, ‘Brother, I was kept where you were kept.’ So, many of us have experienced Aynaghar and its torture.”

Though seemingly innocent, this statement has significant implications:

1. If Hummam Quader Chowdhury and Tareq Rahman were held in the same Aynaghar that the chief adviser visited, then it implies this facility was not created by the Awami League but by the military-backed caretaker government. A retired senior military official confirmed to me that every security agency, including the police and DGFI, maintains detention centers where suspects are interrogated under harsh conditions. This has been true under all regimes. Currently, many Awami League activists are also subjected to unethical interrogation methods, which are legally unjustified. The term “Aynaghar” is just a rebranding of such centers for political framing.
2. The claim that Aynaghar was created during Sheikh Hasina’s rule appears to be inaccurate. The center existed beforehand and was merely refurbished for inspection. Despite this, it became a symbol of political repression against the Awami League. Interestingly, its exact location has never been revealed.
3. The term “Aynaghar” represents a classic case of negative framing, a strategy more effective than positive framing, according to psychologists like Ledgerwood. Historical examples include terms like “Tricky Dick” for Nixon and “Crooked Hillary” for Clinton. Media outlets like Netra News and Al Jazeera played a role in spreading this narrative against Sheikh Hasina.
4. The interim government initially claimed all Aynaghars were shut down, only to later announce a visit to one such center. This contradiction raises questions about the authenticity of their statements.
5. Despite emotional appeals during the visit, public skepticism remained. People questioned why the so-called Aynaghar appeared newly built and why no addresses of the hundreds of alleged centers were shared.
6. Later, a video emerged supposedly showing Sheikh Hasina admitting to establishing Aynaghar. This was later debunked as fake, illustrating the extent of the negative framing against her.
7. We then attempt a comparative analysis of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings under the Awami League and a hypothetical BNP government (using forecasting models since BNP’s rule ended in 2006).

Let us now explain the purpose of today’s article.
There has always been discourse, both domestically and internationally, regarding enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings during the Awami League’s tenure. The BNP, too, strongly criticizes the Awami League over these issues. For this reason, we have attempted to use statistical methods to explore what the actual scenario might have looked like if the BNP had ruled for fourteen years.

It is important to clarify here that we, under no circumstances, support any form of enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. However, we are interested in evaluating the proportional performance of different governments in Bangladesh, so that each party is encouraged to reflect on its own record—especially since self-criticism is a largely absent trait in the Bengali political psyche.

Therefore, this segment of today’s discussion aims to present a partial snapshot of the BNP era, which ended almost two decades ago, in comparison to the recently concluded tenure of the Awami League government.

Our intention is to examine whether the negative framing against the Awami League—such as the accusations surrounding the “Aynaghar” (Mirror Room)—is one-sided or not.

According to Bangladesh’s Goebbels-like Press Secretary Shafiqul Alam, there are reportedly seven to eight hundred ‘Aynaghars’ (mirror rooms) across the country. If this information is correct, and if on average one person was killed in each Aynaghar, then the number of people killed would amount to at least seven to eight hundred. According to the information from the Disappearance Commission, they have been able to verify a total of 758 cases of enforced disappearances. We will accept this number as accurate for our analysis, but we would like to share two significant observations at this point.

First: Among those who were reportedly held in Aynaghars, we have only heard publicly about five to seven individuals. Among them are Brigadier Azmi, known for his gleaming towel soaked in tears for eight years, Michael Chakma, Hummam Chowdhury, etc. Toward the end of the movement, others like Nahid Islam, Asif Mahmud, Sarjis Alam also emerged. The media reports specific details of roughly five to twenty individuals. Since the beginning, we have raised two demands: (1) A detailed list of individuals detained or disappeared in Aynaghars should be provided; and (2) A list of the Aynaghars with their addresses should be disclosed. Needless to say, neither of these demands has been fulfilled. Even regarding the one Aynaghar that was “visited,” no detailed information has been provided. The press secretary mentioned only that some paintwork had been done. That’s it; no further information.

Second: Regarding enforced disappearances, the Commission states that it has received a total of 1,676 complaints. Among those, 758 complaints have been verified. If we assume these 758 cases occurred over 15 years, and if there were 800 Aynaghars in the country, then the average number of disappearances per Aynaghar would be less than one over fifteen years.

Next, when we compare the disappearances under both the Awami League and the BNP governments, we see that from 2001 to 2006, disappearances were not documented for various reasons. However, for extrajudicial killings during 2004-06, we do get some statistics from the human rights organization Odhikar (Bari, 2022). Odhikar claims that 991 people fell victim to extrajudicial killings between 2004 and 2006. We also know that between 2001 and 2003, a large number of extrajudicial killings occurred during Operation Clean Heart. Considering the overall situation, we decided to use statistical forecasting models to compare disappearances and extrajudicial killings during the rule of both parties (Awami League and BNP). Another reason for this is that various human rights reports indicate a positive correlation between enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Thus, to ensure maximum impartiality in the analysis, we evaluated the BNP’s 14-year hypothetical rule (2001–2014) against the Awami League’s actual 14-year tenure (2009–2023) using forecasting models.

Several incidents that occurred during the post-BNP rule (2007–2008) are mentioned in reports by various human rights organizations. Based on those, ChatGPT generates estimated figures for disappearances and extrajudicial killings between 2001 and 2014. It is important to remember that these are not actual numbers, because BNP’s rule ended in 2006. Based on the grounds of extrajudicial killings, political persecution, and unlawful arrests, we use artificial intelligence and statistical forecasting techniques to estimate the lower and upper bounds of disappearances during 2001–2014. These are merely estimates. On the other hand, according to the human rights group Odhikar, 991 individuals were subjected to extrajudicial killings from 2004–2006. Using this figure, ChatGPT estimates disappearances and extrajudicial killings for the periods 2001–06 and 2001–14 (hypothetical BNP rule). Readers may use ChatGPT themselves to verify the validity of our analysis.

Now let us present our analysis. According to the Disappearance Commission report, from 2009 to 2023, a total of 758 disappearance cases were verified. The highest number of such cases occurred between 2014 and 2017 (see Bonik Barta, 2024); we remind readers of that specific period. First, in 2014, so-called “fire terrorism” erupted in an attempt to prevent the election; then in 2015–16, the country faced a wave of Islamic terrorism. There may be a connection between these situations and the rise in disappearances.

Now we come to the main comparison. We find that under BNP rule, if extended to fourteen years, extrajudicial killings would have occurred at a much higher rate. The lowest estimate for BNP is 5,178 compared to the Awami League’s 2,699 extrajudicial killings. On the higher end, under a hypothetical 14-year BNP tenure, the forecasted number of such incidents rises to 6,134, with an even higher range reaching 7,727. In every scenario, BNP appears significantly ahead of the Awami League in terms of extrajudicial killings. On the other hand, for disappearances, the Awami League’s time shows significantly higher numbers. Even under the highest forecast for 2001–2014, BNP’s time would have seen around 321 disappearance cases, while the Disappearance Commission confirmed 758 such cases during the Awami League’s 14-year rule. (The full visualization of this analysis is presented in the Chart below.)

That concludes today’s discussion. We aimed to show that the accusation of Aynaghar creation against the Awami League is not accurate. These Aynaghars are essentially detention centers used by various security agencies. Secondly, the sweeping accusations solely blaming the Awami League for disappearances and extrajudicial killings are also not entirely correct. In the context of Bangladesh, such responsibilities are shared by all ruling parties.

Bangladesh has renamed the UNESCO-recognized Bengali New Year procession, previously known as “Mangal Shobhajatra,” to “Barshavaran Ananda Shobhajatra” following demands from Hefazat-e-Islam and other Islamic political parties and religious organizations. The change reflects a shift in the event’s name and contents, amid claims that its previous form resembled Hindu cultural traditions.
Bangladesh is set to celebrate Bengali New Year 1432, popularly known as “Pohela Boishakh,” on April 14. Mangal Shobhajatra, organized annually by the Faculty of Fine Arts of Dhaka University, has been widely recognized as a symbol of the secular identity of Bangladeshi people and was declared an intangible cultural heritage by UNESCO in 2016.
The announcement of the name change was made during a press conference at the Faculty of Fine Arts of Dhaka University on Friday. Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, the interim government’s leader, described the changes as part of the “New Bangladesh” policy of cultural healing and inclusiveness.
“This year’s Pohela Boishakh will be characterized by cultural healing and cultural inclusiveness,” said Mostafa Sarwar Faruki, Adviser for Cultural Affairs to the interim government.
Hefazat-e-Islam, the largest religious group in Bangladesh, voiced concerns over the previous procession’s perceived alignment with Hindu traditions. Leaders, including Ameer Allama Muhibullah Babunagari and Secretary General Allama Sajedur Rahman, criticized elements of the Pohela Boishakh celebrations, claiming universality had been used to impose Hindu Janmashtami rituals on all participants.
Mufti Syed Muhammad Faizul Karim, the Peer of Charmonai, echoed similar sentiments, demanding the removal of Hindutva symbols and concepts from the festivities. He specifically called for the elimination of the word “Mangal” from the event’s name.
As preparations continue for Pohela Boishakh 1432, the name change reflects the balancing act between cultural identity and inclusiveness in Bangladesh’s national celebrations.