The government of Bangladesh has formally sought China’s involvement and support in implementing the long-discussed Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP), reviving one of the country’s most strategically sensitive infrastructure and water-management initiatives amid renewed regional geopolitical competition and worsening environmental distress along the Teesta basin.
The initiative could further complicate Bangladesh’s already sensitive relations with India, which has its own strategic interests in the Teesta project. “Leaving behind past tensions, both countries can move forward based on practical realities and mutual interests,” Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said on Wednesday, signaling Delhi’s continued interest in engagement with Dhaka over shared river issues. Analysts warn that Bangladesh’s renewed push for Chinese involvement may deepen regional competition between the two Asian powers over influence in Bangladesh’s river and infrastructure sectors.
The Teesta issue came into focus during a bilateral meeting between Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dr. Khalilur Rahman and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Diaoyutai State Guest House in Beijing on May 6, where both countries reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening their “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.”
The visit marked Dr. Rahman’s first official trip to China since assuming office. The three-day visit, held at the invitation of Wang Yi, underscored how the Teesta issue has once again become central to Bangladesh’s foreign policy and regional diplomacy.
The proposed Teesta project, originally conceived during the administration of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, has long been viewed as a transformative initiative intended not only to restore the river ecosystem but also to revive agriculture, prevent floods and erosion, generate renewable energy, and create economic opportunities in northern Bangladesh.
A River at the Center of Political and Humanitarian Crisis
The Teesta is one of Bangladesh’s most politically sensitive transboundary rivers. Originating in the Himalayas, it flows through the Indian states of Sikkim and West Bengal before entering Bangladesh. Over the years, multiple dams and barrages built upstream in India have dramatically altered the river’s natural flow.
For millions of residents in districts such as Rangpur, Nilphamari, Kurigram, Lalmonirhat, and Gaibandha, the consequences have been devastating.
During the dry season, insufficient downstream water flow leaves large parts of the riverbed barren, crippling irrigation and agriculture. During the monsoon, sudden releases of water from upstream Indian barrages often trigger severe floods and riverbank erosion, washing away homes, cropland, and infrastructure.
“During the dry season when we need water, India does not release enough. Then in the monsoon they release massive amounts at once, flooding homes and farmland or causing river erosion,” Nazrul Islam Haqqani, president of the Teesta Bachao Nodi Bachao Sangram Parishad, told The Voice.
The frustration among residents of northern Bangladesh has intensified over the years as successive diplomatic efforts failed to secure a durable water-sharing agreement with India.
The Unfinished 2011 Teesta Water Deal
The Teesta water-sharing dispute between Bangladesh and India dates back decades. In 2011, after prolonged negotiations under the Awami League government, Dhaka and New Delhi reportedly finalized a draft agreement on Teesta water sharing. However, the deal was never signed because of objections from then-West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee.
That deadlock has persisted for nearly 15 years.
Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, speaking to visiting Bangladeshi journalists in New Delhi on Wednesday (May 6), said India remained open to discussions with Dhaka if Bangladesh clarified its priorities in bilateral relations.
“Leaving behind past tensions, both countries can move forward based on practical realities and mutual interests. If Bangladesh defines its priorities, we are ready for discussions,” Misri said during the exchange meeting in the Indian capital.
Although Misri did not provide any direct commitment on the stalled Teesta agreement, he said discussions on the 54 shared rivers between Bangladesh and India would continue through the Joint Rivers Commission.
His remarks came as political changes in West Bengal have reopened debate over whether a Teesta agreement may finally become possible. Analysts note that the recent electoral defeat of Mamata Banerjee could potentially reduce one of the major political barriers that had blocked progress since 2011.
Still, skepticism remains widespread.
Sheikh Hasina’s Vision and China’s Early Involvement
The Teesta restoration initiative took concrete shape during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, when Dhaka pursued Chinese support for a comprehensive river-management plan.
The proposed masterplan, formally known as the “Comprehensive Management and Restoration of Teesta River Project,” began preliminary survey work in 2016. Following years of joint studies by Bangladesh’s Water Development Board and China’s PowerChina, an evaluation report was prepared in 2023.
The plan envisioned sweeping redevelopment along the Teesta basin.
Key components include:
- Construction of a multipurpose barrage upstream in Bangladesh
- Dredging approximately 102 kilometers of the river
- Building 203 kilometers of embankments to prevent erosion
- Recovering 171 square kilometers of land
- Establishing satellite towns, hotels, and tourism facilities
- Constructing a 150-megawatt solar power plant
- Transforming the region into a tourism and economic hub
The estimated cost was initially projected at around Tk 12,000 crore, with much of the financing expected to come through loans.
China had consistently shown interest in financing and implementing the project during the Awami League era. But geopolitical sensitivities, particularly India’s concerns about Chinese strategic influence in Bangladesh, slowed progress before the project could enter its full implementation stage.
India, China and the Geopolitical Battle Over Teesta
The Teesta project has evolved far beyond a water-management initiative. Analysts increasingly view it as part of a wider strategic competition between India and China in South Asia.
China’s interest is widely linked to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly the proposed Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor aimed at enhancing regional connectivity across Asia.
Anusua Basu Ray Chaudhury, a researcher at India’s Observer Research Foundation, said in a 2024 interview with BBC that China’s broader connectivity ambitions likely influence its interest in Teesta-related infrastructure.
India, meanwhile, has long viewed expanding Chinese involvement near its northeastern corridor with caution. That concern became especially visible in 2024, when India moved to reassert interest in the Teesta project.
In May 2024, then-Indian Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra visited Dhaka to discuss the issue. The following month, during Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi publicly indicated Indian interest in joining the Teesta masterplan and announced that an Indian technical team would soon visit Bangladesh.
After returning to Dhaka, Sheikh Hasina remarked to journalists: “The demand for Teesta water has existed for a long time. If India itself implements the Teesta project, then our problems would be solved. That would be easier for me.”
Many observers at the time believed India might ultimately take over implementation of the project.
However, the political upheaval that followed the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government dramatically altered the equation. After the interim administration led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus assumed power, Dhaka again moved closer to Beijing regarding Teesta cooperation. During Yunus’s visit to China in March 2025, officials indicated that China would likely implement the project.
At the same time, BNP leaders intensified political campaigns in northern Bangladesh demanding implementation of the Teesta masterplan and the securing of Bangladesh’s “fair share” of Teesta waters.
Before the national election, BNP Acting Chairman Tarique Rahman also pledged that his party would implement the Teesta masterplan if returned to power.
Local Communities Remain Skeptical
Despite renewed diplomatic momentum, many residents along the Teesta basin remain unconvinced that meaningful change is imminent.
“We have seen these discussions many times before. Until the project is formally launched and the government announces a clear roadmap, we cannot feel reassured,” Nazrul Islam Haqqani said.
Activists also argue that Bangladesh cannot focus solely on internal river management while ignoring the unresolved issue of fair water distribution.
“The masterplan is essentially an internal river management initiative. But water flow itself must also be ensured. Bangladesh must secure its rightful share of Teesta water as an international common river,” Haqqani added.
Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman acknowledged the uncertainty surrounding India’s future position but insisted Bangladesh could no longer afford inaction.
“It is not my job to read their minds. But we hope the earlier agreement can be reconsidered in the current situation. At the same time, we cannot simply sit idle — we must continue our own work,” Rahman told journalists before departing for China.
A Symbol of Northern Bangladesh’s Neglect
For many observers, the Teesta issue has become symbolic of broader frustrations over regional inequality and decades of delayed development in northern Bangladesh.
Residents of the Teesta basin have repeatedly accused successive governments of making political promises without delivering concrete implementation. Critics also argue that years of political instability, bureaucratic hesitation, and geopolitical balancing have delayed urgently needed action.
Supporters of the original Teesta masterplan argue that the initiative represented one of the most ambitious long-term river-management strategies undertaken during Sheikh Hasina’s administration. They contend that the political transition and subsequent policy uncertainty slowed momentum at a time when northern Bangladesh was already facing worsening climate vulnerabilities, river erosion, seasonal displacement, and agricultural losses.
While the current government has renewed negotiations with China and signaled commitment to implementation, uncertainty persists over financing, regional diplomacy, environmental sustainability, and whether India will ultimately cooperate or resist expanded Chinese involvement.
What remains undeniable, however, is the growing urgency of the crisis itself.
As climate change intensifies flooding, drought, and river erosion across South Asia, the Teesta River is increasingly becoming not only a diplomatic flashpoint — but also a test of whether Bangladesh can secure long-term water security and economic stability for millions of vulnerable citizens in its northern districts.
