February 11, 2025
Introduction
The political trajectory of Bangladesh has reached an unprecedented threshold of turmoil following the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government. Six months into this upheaval, the nation remains gripped by escalating unrest. The demolition of House No. 32 in Dhanmondi—a site of profound historical and political significance—has exacerbated tensions, symbolizing deepening divisions and calculated power struggles. Widespread arson, vandalism, and targeted violence underscore the volatility of the situation, with law enforcement’s inaction suggesting a deliberate effort to reshape the political narrative. Meanwhile, the interim government struggles to maintain control, grappling with governance challenges, economic instability, and a surge in extremism. The involvement of radical groups and the strategic postponement of elections add further complexity, casting uncertainty over the nation’s political future. International observers have expressed growing concern over the deteriorating security situation, warning of potential repercussions for regional stability. The absence of a clear roadmap for political transition has galvanized public frustration, leading to mass protests and subsequent crackdowns. If left unaddressed, the crisis risks plunging Bangladesh into prolonged instability with far-reaching consequences.
Destruction of House No. 32 and Escalation of Violence
The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government set the nation on a volatile trajectory, culminating in the destruction of House No. 32 in Dhanmondi—once the residence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and later the Bangabandhu Memorial Museum. On February 5 and 6, a large, organized procession of protesters arrived with bulldozers and excavators, systematically dismantling the historic landmark in broad daylight. This moment of calculated destruction occurred mere hours before a scheduled speech by Sheikh Hasina, with police and military personnel at the scene failing to intervene. The attack on this iconic site, which has long served as a space for walking down memory lane and reflecting on Bangladesh’s political history, signalled the deepening fissures within the nation.
As night fell, the unrest intensified, with coordinated arson attacks targeting the residences of prominent AL leaders. Over the next two days, this wave of destruction escalated further as party offices, businesses, and properties linked to AL—including those previously damaged in arson attacks in August—once again fell prey to orchestrated violence. The lack of decisive action by security forces exacerbated public fears of lawlessness and political retribution.
Targeting Cultural and Historical Symbols
Beyond political figures and institutions, the unrest extended to cultural and historical symbols, further exacerbating tensions. Murals and busts of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were defaced and destroyed in multiple locations, reinforcing the deep-seated animosities driving the crisis. Law enforcement agencies, including the police and military, remained passive observers, allowing acts of vandalism and arson to unfold unchecked. Meanwhile, the mainstream media played a crucial role in shaping public perception, portraying these incidents as spontaneous outbursts rather than coordinated political retribution. The Chief Advisor’s office subtly echoed this narrative, framing the violence as an inevitable consequence of ongoing political developments. This nuanced approach to messaging sought to temper public outrage while allowing the crisis to take its own course.
Strategic Calculations Behind the Demolition: A Pre-Planned Operation
Orchestrated Unrest Disguised as Spontaneity
Despite national and international media portraying the attacks, arson, and looting as a spontaneous public outcry—particularly from students—the underlying reality suggests a far more calculated trajectory. These incidents were not impulsive reactions but rather meticulously coordinated efforts, planned well in advance—even before Sheikh Hasina’s speech schedule was publicly announced in February.
In the days leading up to the events, a surge in social media activity aggressively propagating against House No. 32 signalled a deliberate attempt to galvanize public sentiment. Credible intelligence sources suggest that Advisor Mahfuz Alam, in collaboration with his close associate Asad and another ideological figure, orchestrated the operation following extensive discussions. Their strategic deliberations reportedly took place in a private setting—either at Daira (Circle) or Swapran (My Soul), located in Borak Tower near Hotel Intercontinental—approximately ten days prior to the demolition.
Mahfuz Alam subsequently relayed the plan to Advisor Advocate Adilur Rahman, after which it was further refined within an inner circle. This core group comprised two student advisors, Amar Desh editor Mahmudur Rahman, AB Party leader Monzu, Barrister Fuad, Pinaki, and Ilias. Eventually, directives were issued to SAD and NCC, who then engaged JeI, Hefazat, HT, and ABT (AAI) for broader coordination. Strong indications suggest that Dr. Yunus and Home Advisor General Jahangir were also briefed on the unfolding strategy. Crucially, measures were taken to ensure minimal intervention from law enforcement agencies. Rather than thwarting the demolition, reports indicate that the Police Commissioner’s office advised organizers to arrange for bulldozers and excavators. Former SAD coordinator Asif Mahmud, leveraging his position as LGRD advisor—under which Dhaka South City Corporation operates—facilitated access to the necessary heavy machinery, further underscoring the premeditated nature of the operation.
Potential ISI Involvement: A Calculated Disruption?
While no definitive proof has emerged, certain indicators suggest a possible nexus between Pakistan’s ISI and the demolition efforts. Suspicion arises from the precise timing of a post by the ISI-affiliated X handle, Defence Pakistan, which shared news of the incident at 21:20 on February 5, 2025—while the destruction was still in progress. The post, titled “End of a Traitor’s Legacy: Mujibur Rahman’s House in Dhaka Demolished by Bangladeshi Revolutionaries,” featured three video clips, implying prior knowledge or real-time coordination. Given the nuanced geopolitical stakes, such early dissemination raises critical questions about external influences seeking to exacerbate Bangladesh’s internal strife.
The Symbolic Weight of February 5
The incident was strategically framed to appear as a spontaneous reaction from agitated students and the general public following Sheikh Hasina’s speech. To reinforce this narrative, a press release from the Chief Advisor’s office had been drafted in advance—further suggesting a carefully orchestrated effort rather than an organic uprising.
Several symbolic factors influenced the choice of February 5 as the execution date:
Six-Month Anniversary of Sheikh Hasina’s Fall
The six-month milestone since Sheikh Hasina’s departure from power marked a critical threshold for opposition groups and political strategists. This moment served as a catalyst for those seeking to highlight the transition in governance and underscore the perceived failures of her administration. Political discourse, rallies, and public statements on this date were deliberately designed to galvanize support, reinforcing a broader narrative of transformation in Bangladesh’s political landscape.
Ganajagaran Manch Anniversary
A Deeply Polarizing Date Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) perceives the Ganajagaran Manch movement as a state-sponsored mechanism that pressured judicial institutions into executing its top leaders. The movement, which emerged on February 5, 2013, called for justice against 1971 war criminals and significantly influenced public sentiment, ultimately leading to the execution of several JeI figures. Consequently, JeI considers this date a “black day,” viewing it as an orchestrated political assault rather than a legitimate pursuit of justice. The demolition on this particular date thus carried symbolic weight, reinforcing JeI’s long-standing grievances and reasserting its ideological opposition to the secular political establishment.
Hefazat-e-Islami’s Historical Resentment
HeI, which emerged as a counterforce to secularism, views February 5 as the precursor to events that culminated in the violent May 5, 2013, crackdown on its supporters. The group argues that without the Ganajagaran Manch movement, the government’s suppression of religious groups would not have intensified. This long-standing grievance has been a cornerstone of their mobilization strategy, portraying themselves as victims of state-sanctioned persecution. The strategic demolition on this date served to reignite these narratives, fostering renewed antagonism towards the political establishment.
BNP’s Tacit Endorsement and Passive Approval
While BNP did not formally endorse the demolition or the subsequent nationwide unrest, its silence signalled a degree of implicit approval. Many within the party viewed these actions as a form of retribution for Sheikh Hasina’s controversial decision to evict Begum Khaleda Zia from her cantonment residence—a move widely perceived as politically motivated. Though BNP and its student wing, JCD, officially distanced themselves from the events, eyewitness accounts and reports suggest that some of their activists were present at the demolition site. This unofficial presence pointed to either tacit support or, at the very least, a lack of intent to deter such actions.
A Convenient Justification for the Government’s Broader Agenda
The government and its allied groups effectively leveraged Sheikh Hasina’s speech as a pretext to justify the demolitions of structures and settlements associated with opposition-linked entities. However, reports suggest that these plans were in motion well before her public address, highlighting a calculated manoeuvre rather than a reactionary measure. The speech functioned as a political cover, allowing the administration to present these actions as necessary and justified, rather than as premeditated retribution. This strategic framing exemplifies the nuanced use of political rhetoric to shape public perception and minimize international scrutiny.
Political Motives Behind Bangladesh’s Unrest
Deflecting Governance Failures
The recent surge in violence appears to be a deliberate strategy to divert attention from the failures of the interim government. Inability to address critical issues has led to widespread public dissatisfaction, including:
Deteriorating Law and Order: Rising mob violence, increasing crimes against individuals and property, and a pervasive sense of insecurity highlight the failure of law enforcement agencies to maintain stability. The lack of trust in security forces has led to a surge in vigilantism, with communities resorting to extrajudicial means to protect themselves, further undermining the rule of law.
Economic Hardships: The economy is struggling with skyrocketing prices of essential goods, rising unemployment due to factory and business closures, and an impending economic crisis, intensifying public frustration. Widespread layoffs and declining purchasing power have forced many families into poverty, deepening societal divisions and fuelling resentment against the government’s economic mismanagement.
Social Unrest: Escalating campus violence, moral policing, and poor traffic management leading to massive congestion have fuelled tensions across different segments of society. Student protests and labour strikes have become more frequent, reflecting growing discontent among the younger population, who feel increasingly alienated and unheard.
Rise of Extremism: Radicalism is gaining momentum, with extremists securing bail, escaping prison, and spreading their ideologies through social media. The failure to curb extremist networks has emboldened radical elements, allowing them to infiltrate educational institutions and religious spaces to recruit vulnerable individuals.
Governance Collapse: The police, administration, and judiciary continue to deteriorate. Bureaucracy remains inefficient, and corruption within law enforcement has worsened. Commissions set up to tackle these issues have failed to implement meaningful reforms. Nepotism and political influence over key institutions have eroded public confidence, making justice inaccessible to ordinary citizens and allowing criminals to act with impunity.
Media Suppression: The government has tightened control over the press, targeting media owners, editors, and journalists. Self-censorship is prevalent due to threats from authorities, curbing press freedom. Investigative journalism has been stifled, preventing the exposure of corruption and abuses of power, while state-controlled media continues to push a selective narrative.
Energy Crisis: Persistent power outages have exacerbated public discontent, especially in rural areas. These disruptions threaten agricultural production, particularly the irrigation of rice crops. The worsening energy shortage has also hindered industrial productivity, forcing many businesses to shut down or relocate, leading to further economic instability.
Countering AL’s Renewed Popularity
Despite governing for fifteen years, the AL government faced challenges in effectively communicating its development achievements, often struggling to counter criticism and opposition narratives. However, within just six months of the interim administration’s rule, many citizens have begun to reevaluate AL’s tenure, recognizing the relative stability, economic progress, and infrastructural advancements that were previously overshadowed by political rhetoric. The worsening law and order situation, economic hardships, and governance failures under the current regime have inadvertently bolstered AL’s public standing, leading to a resurgence in its support base. In response, the interim government has intensified efforts to discredit AL through orchestrated violence, propaganda, and targeted suppression of its activists and leaders. Political crackdowns, arbitrary arrests, and restrictions on opposition gatherings have increased, as the administration seeks to neutralize AL’s growing influence and prevent its potential return to power. By manipulating public perception and controlling the narrative, the ruling regime aims to diminish AL’s renewed popularity and sustain its own grip on authority, despite mounting dissatisfaction among the masses.
By engineering demolitions and violent incidents, the government seeks to manipulate public perception and justify maintaining its grip on power through a controlled narrative. The strategic use of chaos and misinformation aims to delegitimize opposition voices, ensuring the ruling elite remains unchallenged despite growing dissatisfaction.
Internal Feuds within SAD and NCC
Leadership Crisis: A major source of discord within SAD and NCC arises from leadership disputes. The dominance of Dhaka University (DU) students in leadership roles has marginalized students from other institutions, causing resentment. While private university and college students suffered significant casualties in past movements, no DU students were killed, further intensifying tensions.
Ideological Divisions: The core group within SAD and NCC leans towards pro-Islamic ideology, but many members remain secular or neutral, advocating for the values of the 1971 Liberation War. This ideological divide has created internal strife and weakened organizational cohesion.
Exclusion of Private University Students: The Private University Students Association of Bangladesh (PUSAB), instrumental in previous movements, has been sidelined in both government and organizational roles. This marginalization has caused frustration among private university students and deepened divisions within the movement.
Conflict Over College Students’ Demands: Students from Dhaka’s seven major colleges have long-standing grievances with Dhaka University. Their active participation in movements and sacrifices have yet to yield solutions to their issues. Clashes between these students and the DU administration, including SAD coordinators, have heightened tensions.
Socioeconomic Disparities: A growing divide exists between those in positions of power within the government, SAD, and NCC and those who are not. While the former group enjoys financial and political benefits, the latter feels sidelined, exacerbating internal grievances.
Concerns Over Fund Mismanagement: Transparency issues regarding funds raised for flood relief, assistance to families of deceased protesters, and medical aid for the injured during the July movement have caused dissatisfaction. Many members outside fund management suspect financial misappropriation, further straining internal relations.
These internal conflicts continue to affect the cohesion and effectiveness of SAD and NCC, shaping the broader student movement in Bangladesh.
Delaying Elections for Political Gain
The interim government aims to delay elections as a strategic move to weaken its political opposition and consolidate control over the electoral process. By postponing the polls, it seeks to exert psychological pressure on the BNP, potentially reducing the party’s insistence on immediate elections and forcing it into a more defensive position. The delay also provides an opportunity to destabilize the organizational structure of the AL, weakening its grassroots mobilization and leadership cohesion. This extended period allows the government to implement measures that could diminish opposition momentum, restrict political activities, and shape the electoral landscape to its advantage. Ultimately, the postponement serves as a tool to manipulate the political environment, ensuring a more controlled and favourable outcome when elections eventually take place.
Potential Power Shift and Political Manoeuvering
Speculation has been rife about a possible military intervention aimed at establishing a neutral caretaker administration, reflecting growing concerns over political instability. However, recent developments suggest that this initiative may have been postponed or reconsidered, as the interim government strategically navigates the unrest to pre-empt any military-led transition. By allowing or even amplifying disorder, the government could justify tightening its grip on power, portraying itself as the only viable authority capable of restoring stability. This manoeuvres not only deters external intervention but also signals to the military that any direct involvement would be met with resistance or complications. In doing so, the interim administration reinforces its position while discouraging factions that may favour a caretaker arrangement, ensuring that any transition remains under its control rather than dictated by external forces.
Retaliatory Motives of Islamist Groups
Radical Islamist factions, including JeI, HeI, HuT, ABT, and IAB, have strategically leveraged the ongoing political instability to exact revenge on the ruling AL. These groups, often operating under ideological and organizational alliances, perceive AL as a primary adversary due to its secular policies, stringent counterterrorism measures, and past actions against Islamist networks. Exploiting widespread grievances, they have intensified their propaganda, mobilized supporters, and orchestrated violent demonstrations to challenge the government’s authority. Their retaliatory actions range from targeted attacks and orchestrated disruptions to spreading extremist narratives aimed at undermining AL’s legitimacy. By capitalizing on public discontent and political unrest, these factions seek not only to weaken the ruling party but also to advance their broader goal of establishing an Islamist state, further exacerbating Bangladesh’s volatile political landscape.
Resilience Amid Crisis: AL’s Response to Political Repression
Implications for Awami League: The recent demolition of the historic 32 House, alongside the destruction of residences belonging to various AL leaders across Bangladesh, has initially left many party members and supporters in shock and distress. The targeted vandalism of Bangabandhu murals and busts has further deepened the sense of grievance within AL, fuelling concerns that these acts are deliberate attempts to weaken the party’s morale and presence. While the immediate reaction has been one of frustration and devastation, the long-term implications suggest a shift in the party’s approach to the crisis.
Rather than succumbing to despair, AL and its affiliates have demonstrated resilience, with resistance movements emerging in several districts and upazilas. These localized efforts to counteract the perceived repression have served as a morale booster, reinforcing party unity. Additionally, public sentiment appears to be evolving, with many ordinary citizens now sympathizing with AL, viewing it as a victim of politically motivated oppression. This changing perception has provided the party with an opportunity to rally support and strengthen its grassroots networks.
In response to the growing crisis, AL leaders who had initially gone into hiding are now resurfacing, actively working to reorganize and mobilize their supporters. Their efforts signal a strategic push to rebuild cohesion and maintain the party’s influence despite ongoing adversities. However, challenges remain, particularly with the so-called “Operation Devil Hunt,” which directly targets AL and its affiliates. Moreover, the interim government, allegedly influenced by SAD and NCC, may escalate its crackdown, further testing AL’s resilience. To navigate these obstacles, the party must adopt a calculated approach, leveraging both grassroots activism and strategic planning to withstand the pressure and reinforce its political presence. Countering the Threat of a Potential Ban: With the increasing influence of SAD and NCC, there is a growing threat that the interim government may attempt to ban AL. In response, the party must proactively launch an international advocacy campaign to mobilize diplomatic, political, and human rights organizations against any such move. Engaging key global stakeholders—including influential nations, international legal bodies, and media networks—will be crucial in exerting pressure on the interim government.
Simultaneously, AL should develop a comprehensive contingency plan outlining legal, political, and organizational strategies to counter any potential ban. This should include legal challenges, mass mobilization efforts, and alternative avenues for political engagement to ensure its survival and continued influence. If banned, AL must swiftly adapt, leveraging grassroots networks and international backing to sustain its political momentum and resist authoritarian suppression.
Challenges Within the SAD and NCC Movements
The SAD and NCC movements face significant internal divisions that could undermine their cohesion and overall effectiveness. A key challenge is ideological conflict, as factions within the movements are divided between those favouring direct confrontation with authorities and those advocating for strategic negotiations to achieve their objectives. This discord weakens decision-making and creates an unstable foundation for collective action. Additionally, exclusionary practices, particularly the alienation of private university students and marginalized groups, risk creating discontent and potential splinter factions that could fragment the movements further. Such divisions not only limit their reach but also reduce their legitimacy as inclusive resistance groups. Another pressing issue is the growing Islamist influence within the movements, as pro-Islamist factions could steer the agenda toward a more radical stance, potentially deviating from the original objectives and alienating broader support bases. If left unaddressed, these internal rifts may lead to diminished public trust, reduced mobilization, and ultimately, the weakening of the movements’ impact.
Prolonging Elections and the Rise of a New Political Party
Recent developments may prompt the government to extend its rule by further delaying elections, citing political instability or external pressures as justification. With the opposition weakened and fragmented, the ruling party could tighten its grip through legislative manoeuvres or administrative delays, further consolidating power. However, this shifting political landscape also presents an opportunity for a pro-Islamist political party—backed by SAD and NCC—to gain traction. If public discontent deepens due to governance failures, economic instability, or democratic backsliding, a new pro-Islamist force led by SAD and NCC, positioning itself as a credible alternative, could attract support from disillusioned voters, civil society groups, and even segments of the establishment seeking change. The success of such a party, however, would depend on its ability to overcome challenges posed by AL, BNP, and secular forces, build grassroots momentum, and articulate a unifying vision that resonates with a broad electorate.
SAD and NCC’s Plan for a Constituent Assembly Election
The SAD and NCC appear resolute in their push to rewrite the constitution, discarding the existing framework in favour of a new political order that legitimizes the prolonged interim government. In a bold escalation, a march to Banga Bhavan may be launched to pressure the president into resignation, directly challenging the administration’s legitimacy. Simultaneously, a sit-in protest in front of the cantonment is anticipated, strategically aimed at deterring potential military intervention while reinforcing the dominance of the SAD, NCC, and Islamist-backed unelected authoritarian government in the unfolding political struggle. These coordinated efforts signal an intensifying confrontation with the potential to redefine the nation’s governance landscape.
Pro-Islamist Military Elements and the Role of Former CAS Iqbal Karim
A faction within the army, reportedly influenced by Islamist ideologies linked to groups such as JeI, HuT, and ABT, may seek to exert pressure on the military leadership to either remain neutral or tacitly align with the SAD. This internal dynamic adds a layer of complexity to the unfolding crisis, as ideological undercurrents within the armed forces could shape the institution’s response. Meanwhile, retired officers, led by former CAS Iqbal Karim Bhuiyan (IKB), are emerging as significant players in this power struggle, with their influence potentially swaying key decisions within the military establishment. Notably, IKB has reportedly postponed the launch of his political party, a move that suggests he may be anticipating a broader political upheaval and positioning himself strategically for a future role in the shifting landscape. His actions indicate a calculated approach, potentially waiting for the right moment to capitalize on the ongoing instability.
Islamist Mobilization in Support of SAD
Islamist groups such as JeI, HeI, IAB, HuT, ABT and other factions could play a crucial role in amplifying SAD’s mobilization efforts by leveraging their ideological networks, organizational structures, and grassroots reach. These groups may expand street mobilization by deploying their activists, madrasa students, and supporters to bolster anti-AL and anti-Indian protests, ensuring sustained public demonstrations. Additionally, they could provide ideological and logistical backing by framing the movement within an Islamist discourse, offering strategic coordination, and utilizing their institutional resources such as mosques, religious schools, and affiliated organizations. Their influence over political narratives would further align SAD’s objectives with broader Islamist goals, using rhetoric that resonates with conservative and radical segments of society. By embedding their agenda within the movement, these Islamist factions could drive public sentiment, shift discourse in their favour, and create a more structured opposition against AL and well as BNP and India.
Conclusion
The ongoing political crisis in Bangladesh is not a product of spontaneous unrest but a strategically driven sequence of events shaped by political, ideological, and strategic interests. The interim government, seeking to tighten its grip on power, continues to exploit instability to justify authoritarian measures, including increased media censorship, restrictions on political activities, and suppression of opposition voices. Efforts to consolidate control over law enforcement and delay elections under the pretext of stability further indicate an attempt to maintain power rather than address governance failures. Economic challenges persist, yet rather than implementing structural reforms, the government may resort to superficial solutions to placate public dissent temporarily.
Simultaneously, the SAD and NCC movements face growing internal divisions that threaten their cohesion and effectiveness. Disagreements over strategy—between factions advocating for direct confrontation and those favouring negotiations—have created fractures within the opposition, weakening its collective impact. The exclusion of private university students and marginalized groups risks alienating key segments of the movement, potentially driving them toward alternative political alignments or seeking external support. Moreover, the rising influence of pro-Islamist elements within these movements presents a challenge to their ideological integrity, as it could divert them from their original objectives and alienate moderate supporters. Without strong, cohesive leadership and a unified strategy, these movements may struggle to sustain momentum and exert meaningful political influence in the evolving landscape.
As Bangladesh navigates this period of uncertainty, the shifting balance of power between the interim government, opposition forces—including AL and BNP—and grassroots movements will play a decisive role in shaping the nation’s trajectory. The continued suppression of AL and the government’s manipulation of the political climate could intensify public resentment, heightening the risk of widespread civil unrest or even external intervention. Conversely, a unified opposition—bringing together AL, secular forces, and BNP under a shared vision for democratic reforms—could present a formidable challenge to the ruling regime. If these factions can set aside their differences and unite around a common agenda, they may leverage public discontent to mobilize broader resistance against the interim government’s authoritarian rule, potentially with the support of radical and Islamist groups. The coming months will be crucial in determining whether Bangladesh succumbs to deeper authoritarian consolidation alongside radical and extremist forces or embarks on a renewed path toward democratic governance.