During the protests, some violent mobs targeted police and Awami League officials or supporters, engaging in lynching and other serious retaliatory violence. In many cases, these were direct responses to illegal violence committed by or blamed on the victims.
For example, on July 19, in Uttara, a mob brutally assaulted the former mayor of Gazipur and lynched one of his associates. This happened because they were accused of firing shots at protesters as armed Awami League supporters.
The most serious incidents began on August 4. As the former government lost control over the country, retaliatory violence against the Awami League and police escalated.
In Sirajganj’s Raiganj, a group of men armed with machetes and iron rods—who looked different in attire from other protesters—attacked and set fire to a local Awami League office. The attackers killed five Awami League officials and one journalist. One of the officials was first humiliated in public, forced to do squats while holding his ears, and then beaten to death.
On the same day, a large group of young men attacked Enayetpur station in the same district. According to police sources, 15 officers were killed in the incident.
On August 5, in Feni, three police stations were set on fire and looted, and 16 police officers were attacked. The day before, on August 4, 300–400 armed Awami League supporters attacked student protesters in Feni, killing 8 protesters and seriously injuring 79, according to police reports.
In Rangpur, armed Awami League supporters, including a city councilor, opened fire on protesters. Later, an enraged mob lynched the councilor and his associate, then dragged his body through the streets.
In Narsingdi, an angry mob chased and lynched six Awami League supporters who were accused of firing at protesters. After Sheikh Hasina fled the country on August 5, retaliatory violence surged. Police stations across the country were attacked and burned down. According to Bangladesh Police, out of 639 stations, 450 were attacked or damaged.
Many police officers fled, while some were beaten to death or otherwise killed.
Police Station Attacks:
- On August 5, when Savar police station was attacked and set on fire, police opened fire to escape. In Sylhet, multiple stations were attacked; in one case, officers took refuge in a mosque to protect themselves. In Rampura, a local imam helped evacuate police to safety.
- At Jatrabari police station, after indiscriminate police firing, a violent mob threw petrol bombs, set fire, and looted the station. Two RAB officers and at least four Ansar/VDP and police officials were killed. Survivors fled, with some seeking refuge with locals. In Uttara East police station, attackers killed four officers. In Ashulia, mobs executed at least three officers, then burned their bodies in retaliation for police killings. In three locations, officers’ bloodied bodies were publicly displayed.
Awami League Offices and Leaders Targeted:
From August 5, mobs attacked Awami League offices and leaders. Testimonies given to OHCHR indicate that BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami supporters were involved. BNP admitted on August 10 that some local leaders and members of its Chhatra Dal and Jubo Dal had participated in retaliatory violence, leading to 44 members being expelled.
- Dhanmondi Awami League office was attacked multiple times in early August. On August 5, after employees left, a violent mob stormed the building and set it on fire. In Jatrabari, a group of attackers stabbed an Awami League supporter to death, whom the victim’s family identified as BNP members.
- Awami League leaders’ homes, businesses, and properties were attacked, looted, and set on fire. In one case, BNP supporters stormed a business owned by a senior Jubo League leader, took his parents hostage, and extorted ransom through a local BNP leader. In another case, in Jessore, a hotel owned by an Awami League leader was set on fire, killing 24 people. Opposition supporters attacked the Prime Minister’s residence, Ganabhaban, and looted and bombed the Bangabandhu Memorial Museum.
Retaliatory Sexual Violence:
OHCHR documented an incident of sexual violence. In August, a woman was confronted by two men who did not appear to be students. They identified her as a Chhatra League member, verbally harassed her, slapped her face repeatedly, punched her chest, and tore her clothes. Days later, she suffered a more severe attack, where she was surrounded, stripped, groped, and ultimately raped. Due to political affiliation, hospitals refused her medical treatment.
Other Awami League and Chhatra League women received rape threats through social media. OHCHR believes many more cases of sexual violence remain undocumented.
After Sheikh Hasina’s fall, police officers were too afraid to report to work, rendering law enforcement ineffective. This allowed more retaliatory violence and opportunistic crimes. Although most violence peaked on August 5, OHCHR continued to receive reports of attacks on Awami League supporters even after the interim government took power on August 8.
For example, on August 15, a BNP and Jamaat-backed group attacked Awami League supporters during a memorial event for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s assassination. Dozens of people were injured, including many women, and an Awami League leader later died from injuries sustained in the attack. On August 14, BNP supporters attacked a factory owned by a prominent Awami League supporter, extorted money from the owner, and later burned down the factory. Police did not respond or investigate the incident.
Violence Against Religious and Indigenous Minorities:
Bangladesh is home to various religious, ethnic, and linguistic minorities who have historically faced systemic discrimination, despite legal protections. During political instability, these groups became targets of hate crimes and misinformation.
OHCHR conducted 34 interviews, including 12 direct victims of attacks between July 1 and August 15, 2024. Attacks on Hindus, indigenous people from the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), and Ahmadi Muslims worsened after incidents like police station takeovers.
Reasons behind these attacks include religious and ethnic discrimination, retaliation against minority Awami League supporters, and local disputes over land and personal conflicts. Misinformation further complicated the understanding of these events.
Despite these challenges, OHCHR gathered enough evidence to outline a pattern of escalating violence, with cases of land grabs, arson, and forced evictions targeting Hindu households, businesses, and temples.
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