The recent armed clashes between India and Pakistan have created an unintended proving ground for competing military technologies. A more consequential narrative is unfolding: Chinese military hardware facing off against Western and Russian systems in real-world conditions.
Pakistan’s arsenal, shaped by extensive defence cooperation with China, has increasingly incorporated advanced air and missile systems, drones and multirole fighters, in contrast to India’s diversified mix of Russian, Western and domestically adapted platforms.
The price differential between Chinese and Western military systems is substantial. Pakistan’s Chinese-made Wing Loong II drones cost around US$1-2 million per unit, while comparable Western systems like the American MQ-9 Reaper are reportedly priced at around US$30-40 million.
This cost advantage also extends to fighter aircraft, with the JF-17 Thunder costing an estimated US$25-32 million per unit compared to India’s French-made Rafale fighters’ reported price of US$288 million.
The battlefield testing of Chinese weapons systems may signal a strategic paradigm shift in global military dynamics. For decades, Western military technology – particularly American weapons systems – has maintained unquestioned superiority, justifying premium pricing and reinforcing geopolitical hierarchies.
Even if Chinese technology demonstrated only 70-80 per cent of Western capabilities at 20-30 per cent of the cost, this creates quite a value proposition that could reshape global defence procurement and strategic alignments.
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For China, this unintended demonstration validates decades of military modernisation efforts without risking its own forces or political capital. The People’s Liberation Army has not engaged in large-scale conflict since its border war with Vietnam in 1979. The Pakistan-India clashes provide crucial operational insights that Chinese military planners would otherwise lack, effectively constituting a form of combat experience by proxy.
This validation on the battlefield accelerates the emergence of a multipolar military technology ecosystem. Countries once dependent on expensive Western systems have a viable alternative that doesn’t carry the political conditions sometimes attached to Western arms deals.
The accessibility of Chinese military technology expands access to advanced warfare capabilities. Countries with modest defence budgets can potentially field sophisticated air defence networks, beyond-visual-range missiles and capable unmanned systems previously attainable only by wealthy states.
This flattening of military capability hierarchies could alter regional power dynamics globally, enabling smaller powers to establish credible deterrence against traditionally dominant neighbours. The strategic implications of this democratisation of military power extend far beyond South Asia to potential flashpoints in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa.
A US F-35 fighter jet flies over a Russian Su-57, parked at Yelahanka airbase in Bengaluru, India, on February 13. Photo: AP
A US F-35 fighter jet flies over a Russian Su-57, parked at Yelahanka airbase in Bengaluru, India, on February 13. Photo: AP
For China’s immediate strategic concerns, this battlefield validation may strengthen its position without direct confrontation. Taipei, which relies heavily on US military technology, might recalculate its defence posture against Beijing’s systems, which have potentially shown their operational credibility against similar platforms.
The conflict also revealed a dimension of China’s “active defence” doctrine. By supplying advanced systems to partners while maintaining strategic distance from direct involvement, China gains valuable operational data and elevated international perception without bearing the political costs of waging war.
Nonetheless, such conclusions warrant caution. Operational experiences in other conflict zones may have raised questions about the performance and resilience of certain Chinese-made systems under contested conditions, such as in Libya and Yemen. Moreover, battlefield claims in Kashmir remain largely unverified, with both India and Pakistan engaged in what some analysts might describe as an information war.
The specific context of this test – between nuclear-armed adversaries – carries extra significance for international security frameworks. A demonstration of nuclear powers engaging in limited conventional warfare using advanced weapons systems could lead to a recalibration of escalation thresholds.
This episode signifies a potential turning point in the global defence landscape as it disrupts the post-Cold War pattern of Western technological dominance. For the US specifically, this represents both a military and economic challenge. The traditional US technological edge, which has underwritten its security partnerships across Asia, faces authentic competition.
Even a partial verification of Chinese weapons systems’ combat effectiveness strengthens Beijing’s position and assertive diplomatic posture throughout the region, which complicates American attempts to maintain its historic strategic advantages.
Western defence establishments face complex challenges in response. The traditional approach of maintaining technological superiority through overwhelming resource allocation appears increasingly unsustainable against China’s more economically efficient model. Western powers must consider if a 2:1 or 3:1 capability advantage justifies a 10:1 cost differential, particularly when quantity itself can be an advantage in many military contexts.
For emerging powers like India, Brazil, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, credible Chinese alternatives create new strategic options when negotiating with traditional Western suppliers. This increasing competition in the defence market could speed up technology transfer agreements, local production arrangements and more favourable pricing – all shifting the balance of global influence.
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The implications extend to international arms control regimes and military technology transfer agreements. As China’s weapons systems show battlefield viability, pressure may mount on Western nations to relax export restrictions to remain competitive. Meanwhile, countries bound to Western defence ecosystems may increasingly hedge their security bets by diversifying suppliers, creating more complex webs of dependency and influence.
While the ceasefire between India and Pakistan is a welcome development, we should not obscure how the conflict represents a more profound shift in global security dynamics. The gradual redistribution of military-technological power represents a structural shift that will shape strategic calculations for decades to come.
This proving ground may strengthen China’s position in great power competition. The conflict validates Beijing’s long-term approach to military modernisation, export-oriented defence and focus on strategic influence partnerships rather than direct projection. This may mark a significant milestone in the emergence of a genuinely multipolar international order.