The provision of a humanitarian corridor from Bangladesh to Rakhine State in Myanmar to relieve the distress caused to the Rohingyas there and also to facilitate their return, has long been a topic of discussion in Bangladesh. But little or no progress has been achieved in this regard because of the complexities, both domestic and international, are involved.
It was the United Nations which mooted the idea in March. It has recently renewed its call for such a corridor, warning that without it, the people in Rakhine will starve. The corridor to Myanmar from Bangladesh was to be an effort to create equitable conditions for Rohingya refugees to eventually return, the U.N. chief António Guterres had said in Dhaka.
But Gutteres cautioned that the Rohingya refugees sheltering in Bangladesh could not make an “immediate and dignified” return to their homeland in Myanmar’s Rakhine state amid the continued fighting there.
“We need to intensify humanitarian aid inside Myanmar to create a condition for that return to be successful,” Guterres said on the penultimate day of his four-day visit to Bangladesh. Setting up a humanitarian aid channel “is obviously a matter that would require authorization and cooperation,” he said without further details.
Aid is crucial as Rakhine is the scene of a deadly conflict between the Myanmar junta and the Arakan Army (AA).
The interim government of Bangladesh led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus, had “conditionally” agreed to grant a “humanitarian corridor.” But his decision has triggered widespread criticism from politicians, security analysts, regional stakeholders, and the general public in Bangladesh.
Few in today’s Bangladesh want to get involved in any conflict outside its borders given the immense domestic problems that are crying for more urgent solutions.
Concerns have been raised about the possible infiltration of Myanmarese militants who have proliferated beyond imagination, with each tribal group having an army of its own. And if the establishment of a corridor led to war, it could result in a further influx of Rohingyas into Bangladesh, it is feared. Refugee influx also means smuggling of drugs and infiltration of religious extremists.
There is a grievance that the Yunus government has been discussing the humanitarian corridor issue with the Arakan Army and the UN without consulting Bangladeshi stakeholders, including political parties, civil society and the media.
The fact that Chief Adviser Munammad Yunus and his National Security Adviser Dr. Khalilur Rahman are known to be close to the US, is triggering the suspicion that they are acting at the behest of the US which has its geopolitical interest in containing Chinese influence in the tribal areas of Myanmar. But Western sources deny an US interest and point out that the corridor plan is a UN plan not an US plan.
Bangladesh Army will be one major actor on this issue. To date, the army has not spoken.
UN Under Secretary General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix pays a courtesy call on with the Chief of Army Staff General Waker-Uz-Zaman, Dhaka, Apr 21. Photo: Bangladesh Army
One of the worrying issues is whether the Myanmar junta will agree to a corridor if it will strengthen the hold of the Arakan Army in Rakhine.
Neither Bangladesh nor the UN can implement the corridor without the consent of the Myanmar Army. Bangladesh’s National Security Adviser Khalilur Rahman has dismissed Myanmar’s objections to Bangladesh’s communication with the Arakan Army. He asserted that the interim government in Bangladesh will engage with any group it deems necessary to protect and promote the national interest.
“It doesn’t matter what anyone says,” Khalilur told reporters. Responding to a question about the Myanmar military junta’s reported objections, he said: “We are a sovereign state. In our interest, we will meet with whoever we want. We have formulated an independent foreign policy and are implementing it.”
“Myanmar has declared the Arakan Army a criminal group, but even they are talking to them. They are talking about ceasefires, aren’t they?” Khalilur Rahman asked.
Following the disclosure of Dhaka’s communication with the Arakan Army in April, Myanmar’s military government, led by General Min Aung Hlaing, had issued a diplomatic note to protest the move. The letter expressed “dissatisfaction” with Bangladesh’s action.
However, during a meeting with Dr Khalilur Rahman, Myanmar’s Foreign Minister U Than Swe informed that they have identified 180,000 Rohingyas eligible for return to Myanmar out of a list of 800,000 sheltered in Bangladesh.
The original list was provided by Bangladesh in six phases between 2018 and 2020. The final verification of another 70,000 Rohingyas by Myanmar is pending, according to the Chief Adviser’s Press Wing.
The Myanmar minister assured that the verification of the remaining 550,000 Rohingyas on the original list will be undertaken on an expeditious basis. Therefore there is light at the end of the tunnel.
If established, the corridor could be beneficial to Bangladesh as it should lead to the Rohingyas leaving Bangladesh to their native homes in Rakhine and relieve Bangladesh of a massive financial burden. It would lead to better relations between Bangladesh and the Arakan army which rules of Rakhine State de facto.
However, Bangladesh has made it clear that it will not send the Rohingyas if they are not assured of participation in the Arakan government as equal partners. There is no point in sending them back if they are going to be stateless or without civic rights. At any rate, no Rohingya will leave Bangladesh without these conditions being met. Therefore, it is a tough call for the Bangladesh government.
Just 15 years after its founding, the Arakan Army (AA) has risen to dominate Rakhine State in western Myanmar, controlling 15 of 17 key townships and over 90% of the territory, including the entire 271-kilometer border with Bangladesh.
Through its Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government (APRG), the AA governs key sectors, from judiciary to public health, signalling its ambition for greater autonomy with confederate status.
With Rakhine’s strategic location, natural resources, and proximity to China-backed infrastructure, and India’s economic plans, the AA’s rise reshapes the region’s geopolitical and security dynamics, presenting both opportunities and challenges for dialogue and stability.
The relationship between the Arakan Army and Rohingya groups is marked by deep-seated mistrust and historical grievances. The Arakanese are Buddhists but the Rohingyas are Muslims. Ethno-nationalism has often marginalised the Rohingya, while human rights violations by the AA have further strained relations. These tensions present a formidable challenge for the establishment peace and a political settlement.
The Myanmar military junta, which is struggling to maintain its grip on power in Arakan, has exploited divisions within Rakhine by recruiting fighters from Rohingya armed groups such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation.
These actions have deepened ethnic fault lines between the Rakhine Buddhist majority and the Rohingya Muslim minority, exacerbating mistrust and perpetuating cycles of violence.
However, the AA has articulated a vision for inclusivity, particularly through the APRG’s administrative framework, to build trust with marginalised communities—including the Rohingyas. But it will be a formidable challenge.
Rakhine State’s wealth of natural resources and its strategic location along the Bay of Bengal have made it a focal point of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Key infrastructure projects, such as the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and the Shwe gas pipeline, represent Beijing’s economic ambitions and geopolitical priorities in the region. These projects not only secure critical energy routes for China but also enhance its access to the Indian Ocean, positioning Rakhine as a key node in its broader regional strategy.
Chinese investments in Myanmar are increasingly vulnerable amid the ongoing civil conflict. Since the launch of “Operation 1027,” anti-junta forces have taken control of 23 out of 34 Chinese-funded projects, with key areas affected including Rakhine, northern Shan State, and the central lowlands.
Bangladesh Army
Bangladesh Army personnel in Myanmar for rescue operation. Photo: Official FB page of Bangladesh Army
To safeguard these investments, China has partnered with Myanmar’s junta to establish a joint security company. But the move risks complicating local dynamics since the presence of foreign security forces could provoke resistance from local armed groups, including the AA, which already wields considerable influence in the area.
As Rakhine’s immediate neighbours, India and Bangladesh have a critical role to play in shaping the region’s future. India’s strategic initiatives, such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, aim to enhance connectivity between its north eastern states and Southeast Asia.
However, the AA’s territorial control poses both challenges and opportunities for New Delhi. Engaging with the AA directly could help India secure its infrastructure projects and foster regional trade. Pragmatic collaboration would not only safeguard India’s investments but also strengthen its influence in Rakhine. Additionally, India’s engagement could serve as a counterbalance to China’s growing presence in the region.
But while the relations between India and the Mynammar junta are good, India’s relations with Bangladesh is currently very bad. The only saving grace is that a solution of the Arakan problem could give an opportunity for India to checkmate China in North-west Myanmar.