- Introduction: A New Chapter in Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations
Since August 2024, relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan have entered one of the most active phases in the history of their bilateral engagement. Diplomatic exchanges have multiplied, trade discussions have gathered pace, educational cooperation has expanded, and military contacts have grown more frequent, all within a remarkably short span. High level visits and renewed channels of communication suggest that both countries are now seeking to move beyond decades of political distance and historical sensitivities that had long kept the relationship at arm’s length. Alongside this official thaw, political parties, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamic organizations in Bangladesh, are reported to be maintaining both open and discreet relationships with Islamic political parties and organizations in Pakistan, adding a less visible but no less significant dimension to this evolving relationship.
- Areas of Expanding Cooperation
Military and Civil Bureaucrat Cooperation
The unfolding closeness between Dhaka and Islamabad since August 5, 2024, the day Sheikh Hasina was forced to leave Bangladesh, marks a genuine shift in South Asia’s security architecture, and the bureaucratic and military channels through which this closeness is being built deserve close scrutiny. Since the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus took office, senior-level military visits between the two capitals have increased markedly, signaling a strategic realignment in the region’s defense diplomacy following the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government. What began with reciprocal visits by army, navy and air force chiefs has, within a year, moved towards talks on a possible Mutual Defense Agreement modelled on Pakistan’s pact with Saudi Arabia, with a joint mechanism reportedly set up to draft it, one that could institutionalize intelligence sharing, joint drills, and arms cooperation. The pace is striking, and it is being driven as much by uniformed officers as by the civil services of the two countries, both of which trace their structure, training ethos, and procedural habits to a shared colonial and post-Partition bureaucratic inheritance. Intelligence cooperation, too, has advanced quietly, with high-level meetings between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Forces Intelligence aimed at strengthening coordination on regional threat assessments.
This is precisely where the worry sets in. Pakistan’s own post-1947 history is, in large part, a history of its military repeatedly overpowering its civil and political institutions, never quite allowing an elected government to complete its tenure without interference, manipulation, or outright removal. A military establishment with that track record at home is now becoming the principal interlocutor for Bangladesh’s own armed forces, at a time when Bangladesh’s interim arrangement is itself unelected and still finding its democratic footing. Bangladesh, which had for decades been reliant on India for much of its defense policy, is now actively diversifying its partners, with reports suggesting Dhaka could acquire JF-17 Thunder fighter jets from Pakistan as part of its Forces Goal 2030 modernization program. Such acquisitions, training exchanges, and intelligence-sharing arrangements do not stay confined to the defense ministries that sign them. They gradually draw in the wider civil bureaucracy, finance, procurement, and home affairs included, and over time they shape how comfortable a country’s military becomes with operating outside elected civilian oversight. If Bangladesh imports not just hardware but also Pakistan’s institutional habits, where the men in uniform see themselves as guardians of the state rather than servants of it, the consequence will not be better regional security but a slow erosion of the very civilian supremacy that Bangladesh’s own bureaucracy, however imperfect, has tried to preserve since 1971.
Trade and Commerce
Economic cooperation has become a feature of this renewed relationship. Business delegations, trade discussions, and efforts to widen commercial exchange have drawn growing attention. Supporters of closer ties argue that Bangladesh should engage with all regional partners to diversify its markets, attract investment, and open new avenues for economic growth. In this view, expanded economic relations with Pakistan are simply part of a wider strategy of regional connectivity.
Education and Scholarships
Education has emerged as another important area of cooperation. Pakistan has expanded scholarship opportunities for Bangladeshi students, giving them access to universities and academic institutions there. For many students, these programs offer genuine educational value and international exposure. Critics, however, point out that such exchanges can also become channels for spreading ideological influence, which is why transparency and academic independence matter here.
Political and Ideological Connections
Alongside government-to-government ties, there is growing attention on the links between political and religious organizations in both countries. Bangladesh’s Jamaat-e-Islami has long-standing ideological connections with various Islamist movements across South Asia. Reports of meetings and cooperation between Islamist student bodies from the two countries have stirred debate about the future role of political Islam in Bangladesh’s public life.
- The Wider Context: Identity, Geopolitics, and Regional Balance
The Rise of Identity-Based Politics
This warming of ties comes at a time when Bangladesh is also debating its own national identity and future direction. Since independence in 1971, the country has tried to balance several competing visions of the state: Bengali nationalism, secular democracy, Islamic identity, and regional geopolitics. Recent developments have brought these old questions back to the surface.
The Anti-India Dimension
Following the July movement of 2024, the slogan “Is it Delhi or Dhaka? Dhaka, Dhaka” gained visibility among sections of the movement’s supporters and became a symbol used by some groups to emphasize political autonomy and resistance to perceived external influence. This narrative has been particularly promoted by Islamist political actors, including Bangladesh Jamaat e Islami and Islami Chhatra Shibir, and has contributed to a shift in political discourse that is more receptive to closer engagement with Pakistan. According to this interpretation, such political messaging has helped create space for renewed relations with Pakistan despite the historical legacy of the 1971 war. The memory of 1971 remains deeply sensitive in Bangladesh because of widespread allegations of mass killings and conflict related sexual violence committed during the conflict under Pakistani military operations, issues that continue to shape national identity and regional politics. Some commentators view the renewed openness toward Pakistan as reflecting an ideological repositioning that challenges the historical narrative formed after Bangladesh’s independence, while supporters describe it as a pragmatic recalibration of foreign relations rather than a rejection of the country’s liberation history.
Influence from the Wider Islamic World
Pakistan is not the only country drawing closer to Dhaka. Turkey too has expanded its footprint across trade, defense, education, and culture at a pace few anticipated even two years ago. The two governments are close to finalizing a Defense Framework for Cooperation, meant to bring years of scattered memorandums into one structured agreement covering joint production, training, and technology transfer. Bangladesh has, in fact, become the fourth-largest importer of Turkish defense equipment since 2021, ranging from howitzers to Bayraktar drones. Trade ambitions run alongside this, with both sides aiming to raise bilateral trade from 1.3 billion dollars to 2 billion dollars and exploring a free trade pact, even as Dhaka looks for new markets ahead of its graduation from the UN’s Least Developed Country category. Turkey has openly said it is ready to fill the space India once held in Bangladesh’s import market, particularly in defense and aviation.
This naturally raises a question that has long simmered in Bangladeshi foreign policy circles: is Dhaka now drifting towards deeper integration with the Muslim-majority world, or simply widening its old habit of strategic balancing? Supporters of diversification argue, reasonably, that depending on too few suppliers is itself a risk, and that wider partnerships bring technology, market access, and room to maneuver at a time when ties with India have cooled. But Bangladesh was founded on a secular and linguistic nationalism, deliberately distinct from a religious basis for statehood, and any deep realignment built around a shared Islamic identity with Ankara and Islamabad carries the risk of quietly altering that character. Critics already point to a perceived resurgence of Islamist politics under the interim government as proof that ideology, not just economics, runs through these new partnerships. Whether Dhaka can absorb these gains without drifting from its secular and non-aligned moorings will be worth watching as the country heads towards its next election.
- The Core Debate: Secularism and Democracy
This is really the heart of the matter. Supporters of secular democracy worry that growing influence from Islamist political movements could affect minority rights, women’s rights, freedom of expression, and the country’s secular constitutional principles. Others argue that Islamic values and democratic governance need not be at odds, and that the two can coexist within a pluralistic political framework.
- Unresolved Issues with Pakistan Remain Overlooked
Despite the recent improvement in bilateral engagement, several long standing issues between Bangladesh and Pakistan remain unresolved and continue to carry historical and political significance. During the 1971 Liberation War, Pakistan’s military operations in what was then East Pakistan have been associated with allegations of mass atrocities, including large scale civilian killings and conflict related sexual violence, issues that remain deeply embedded in Bangladesh’s national memory. Successive governments and public figures in Bangladesh have at different times called for a formal acknowledgement and expression of regret from Pakistan regarding the events of 1971. In addition, Bangladesh has historically raised the issue of its claimed share of the pre 1971 undivided financial assets, including demands estimated at approximately USD 4.52 billion. This unresolved financial question remains one of the most debated diplomatic and economic matters between Dhaka and Islamabad since independence. These historical and financial concerns have received comparatively limited public attention in current discussions on improving bilateral relations, and they also question why political actors advocating closer Bangladesh Pakistan ties, including Islamist political groups, have not placed greater emphasis on addressing these unresolved issues.
- Pakistan’s Internal Challenges and Questions for Bangladesh
Pakistan is currently facing a range of internal challenges that continue to shape both its domestic stability and international standing. Economic pressures, governance concerns, political polarization, the role of the military in public affairs, and security issues related to religious extremism remain subjects of discussion among analysts and international observers. These structural challenges have raised questions about Pakistan’s long term political and economic trajectory. Within this context, a rapid expansion of relations with Pakistan should be approached carefully to avoid unintended political, economic, or ideological consequences. This closer engagement could encourage political narratives that are not aligned with Bangladesh’s historical development model and secular constitutional traditions. Certain Islamist political groups in Bangladesh support stronger relations with Pakistan not only for diplomatic reasons but also as part of their broader political and ideological positioning. Supporters of engagement, however, maintain that diplomatic and economic relations between states should be assessed on contemporary strategic interests rather than historical or ideological alignments alone.
7. Conclusion: Bangladesh’s Strategic Choice
Bangladesh today stands at an important crossroads. Whether closer relations with Pakistan will bring genuine economic opportunities, educational benefits, and new diplomatic options remains very much questionable, even as the deepening of ideological and political connections raises real concerns about national identity, democratic institutions, and the founding principles of the Bangladesh state. The real question, however, is not whether Bangladesh should maintain good relations with Pakistan or other Islamic countries, for every sovereign nation gain from constructive international engagement. The question that truly matters is whether these relationships will strengthen Bangladesh’s independence, democracy, and economic development, or whether they will end up reshaping the country’s political and ideological foundations from within. This concern takes on added urgency given that Islamist extremism is gaining ground in Bangladesh with each passing day, with Jamaat-e-Islami now positioned as the main opposition force. The new dimension being added to Bangladesh-Pakistan relations, therefore, carries with it a heightened risk of feeding this extremism rather than containing it. How this plays out will shape Bangladesh’s future for generations to come.
Parvez Hashem, Lawyer and Human Rights Defender
