Former advisers to Bangladesh’s post-August 2024 interim administration are increasingly distancing themselves from major decisions made during Muhammad Yunus’ 18-month rule, raising a central question over one of the country’s most unstable political transitions: who actually governed Bangladesh?
From the destruction of the Bangabandhu Memorial Museum at Dhanmondi 32 to the controversial U.S.–Bangladesh reciprocal trade agreement signed three days before the February 12 national election, several former advisers have suggested that key decisions were not taken through the formal advisory council. Instead, they have pointed to a smaller informal group, widely described as a “kitchen cabinet.”
Their remarks have come at a sensitive moment. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party, now in power after its sweeping election victory, has sought to shift responsibility for the U.S. trade deal onto the outgoing interim administration. But some of the very figures who served in that administration say they were excluded from the process, ignored in policy discussions, or unaware of the full scope of decisions made in the government’s name.
The pattern is striking. Former foreign affairs adviser Md. Touhid Hossain has said he considered resigning three times. Former adviser M Sakhawat Hossain has said major decisions were made outside the formal cabinet. Former law adviser Asif Nazrul has said he was not called into discussions on U.S. agreements. Former fisheries and livestock adviser Farida Akhter has said she opposed parts of the trade deal but could not stop it. And National Citizen Party spokesperson Asif Mahmud Sajib Bhuiyan, another former adviser, now says a “kitchen cabinet” existed, but he was not part of it.
Together, their statements are feeding a wider public debate: was Bangladesh governed by an accountable interim cabinet, or by a small unelected circle around Yunus?
Trade deal fuels blame game
The immediate trigger is the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed between Bangladesh and the United States on February 9, just three days before the parliamentary election. The White House said the agreement would give exporters from both countries “unprecedented access” to each other’s markets and reduce the U.S. reciprocal tariff rate on Bangladeshi-origin goods to 19 percent.
Bangladesh, in return, committed to preferential market access for U.S. industrial and agricultural products, including machinery, energy products, soy, dairy, beef, poultry and fruit.
The agreement also contains extensive obligations for Bangladesh. It covers customs duties, quotas, licensing, U.S. product standards, agricultural market access, digital trade, sanctions cooperation, export controls, defense trade, nuclear-related purchases and dealings with non-market economies.
Critics say the timing, scope and secrecy of the deal demand parliamentary scrutiny. Although the agreement had not yet come into force, Bangladesh reportedly had already begun signing deals to import U.S. goods under its provisions, raising questions about transparency and national interest.
Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman, who was national security adviser during the interim administration and is now foreign minister in the BNP government, has defended the agreement. On March 4, he rejected claims that it had been rushed before the election and said discussions had started much earlier. He also said the heads of the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami had been informed before the election and had consented to the deal.
“We can exit with a 60-day notice. Therefore, we have not put Bangladesh in any danger,” he said.
That claim was quickly challenged by Jamaat-e-Islami Ameer and parliamentary opposition leader Shafiqur Rahman. In a March 6 Facebook post, he said his party had not been consulted about international agreements signed during the interim government. He repeated the denial in Rangpur on May 15, saying no one from the then government had spoken to Jamaat about the matter.
Former advisers point to informal power center
Asif Mahmud Sajib Bhuiyan, now spokesperson for the National Citizen Party, has become the latest former adviser to enter the debate. Speaking at an emergency press conference at the NCP’s temporary central office in Bangla Motor on May 26, he acknowledged that a “kitchen cabinet” existed within the interim government but denied being part of it.
He also accused the BNP of using the interim administration as a shield over the U.S. trade agreement. He said the BNP was behind the agreement signed three days before the election and used Khalilur Rahman to shift responsibility onto the interim government.
His comments are politically important because the NCP emerged from the anti-Hasina student movement and became one of the most visible political forces during and after the interim period. Its attempt to distance itself from the trade deal suggests the controversy has now entered the space of post-uprising accountability.
Former foreign affairs adviser Touhid Hossain has made an even sharper allegation. In an interview with Jamuna TV, he said a seven-member “kitchen cabinet” effectively steered major decisions of the interim government and met every Tuesday. He also said several advisers had influence over his ministry and that he considered resigning three times.
Touhid distanced the foreign ministry from the U.S. trade agreement, saying it was handled by the commerce ministry and the national security adviser. But that explanation has raised further questions. Foreign agreements normally carry diplomatic implications. If the foreign affairs adviser was not meaningfully involved in a long-term trade arrangement with Washington, normal institutional channels appear to have been bypassed.
Sakhawat Hossain has offered one of the clearest accounts of internal exclusion. In an interview after leaving office, he said major decisions were not taken in the formal cabinet.
“Unfortunately, major decisions were not taken in the cabinet. They were discussed outside,” he said.
Asked about the “kitchen cabinet,” Sakhawat said he did not know who belonged to it, but insisted he was not part of it.
Former law adviser Asif Nazrul has also denied involvement in the U.S. deal process. He said he was not called when Bangladesh signed agreements with the United States because those issues were not treated as his area. That statement has deepened concerns about legal review, especially because the agreement touches trade, investment, regulatory authority, sanctions cooperation and sovereign policy space.
Farida Akhter has offered a different but equally revealing account. She has said the agreement should be placed before parliament and implemented only after public consent. She also said she opposed parts of the deal from inside government, particularly the possibility of cheap U.S. meat, poultry and animal products entering Bangladesh and hurting domestic farmers.
Her position reflects a broader contradiction: some advisers now say they objected internally, but the decisions still went ahead.
Dhanmondi 32 and state responsibility
The accountability crisis is not limited to the trade agreement. The destruction of the Bangabandhu Memorial Museum at Dhanmondi 32 remains one of the most emotionally charged events of the interim period.
On February 6, 2025, thousands of extremists, apparently backed by police and army, set fire to and demolished the historic residence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh’s founding leader. The house was where Mujib declared Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 and where he and most of his family were assassinated in 1975. Sheikh Hasina later turned it into a museum dedicated to his legacy.
For many Bangladeshis, especially those who view the Liberation War legacy as central to the republic’s identity, the destruction of Dhanmondi 32 was not merely an act of mob vandalism. It was an assault on national memory. The failure to prevent it, investigate it transparently or assign political responsibility remains one of the most serious stains on the interim administration’s record.
The broader political context makes these questions even more urgent. The Awami League, Bangladesh’s oldest major political party and the party that led the independence movement, was barred from the February 12 election after its activities were banned and its registration suspended. The BNP then won a sweeping victory, while Jamaat-e-Islami emerged as the parliamentary opposition.
Human rights groups have also reported arbitrary detention of perceived political opponents, denial of bail to Awami League leaders and supporters, and a failure by the interim government to restore law and order fully.
The issue, therefore, is not only who signed a trade agreement. It is whether Bangladesh’s transition was conducted through transparent institutions or through selective exclusion, informal power centers and post-facto blame-shifting.
The BNP government now faces its own test. It cannot credibly criticize the interim administration’s opaque decision-making while retaining the benefits of disputed decisions without review. If the U.S. agreement serves Bangladesh’s interests, the government should publish a clear explanation. If it harms sovereignty, food security, energy policy or domestic producers, it should reopen negotiations or use the exit provisions cited by Khalilur Rahman.
Either way, the matter belongs before parliament, not inside another closed circle.
The former advisers’ recent statements show that the post-August 2024 order is beginning to fracture under the weight of its own contradictions. Those who once served the interim administration are now saying they were not consulted, not included, not responsible or not powerful enough to stop controversial decisions.
That may protect individual reputations. It does not answer the national question: who governed Bangladesh when institutions were weakened, a major political party was barred, a historic national site was destroyed, and long-term international commitments were signed days before an election?
Until that question is answered through transparent inquiry, parliamentary debate and public disclosure, the legacy of the Yunus interim administration will remain contested — not only by its opponents, but increasingly by those who served inside it.
