Saudi Arabia and China have jointly launched their third bilateral naval exercise, “Blue Sword 2025.” The drill marks not only a new chapter in military cooperation but also reflects China’s growing influence in Saudi Arabia’s defense sector — particularly in Riyadh’s pursuit of greater internal security self-reliance.
The exercise began at the King Abdulaziz Naval Base on Saudi Arabia’s eastern coast, with both countries’ navies participating. According to the Saudi Ministry of Defense, the drill aims to “exchange experience and enhance the combat readiness of participants.”
Senior Colonel Jiang Bin, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Defense, stated that the exercise would “promote the exchange of skills and tactics between the two countries’ forces and strengthen their military friendship.”
The first “Blue Sword” exercise took place in 2019 in China’s Guangdong Province and focused on counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations. The second, held in Zhanjiang in 2023, included special operations, rescue missions, and maritime boarding drills. This year’s edition adds tactical drone operations and sea mine neutralization training.
In June, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman visited Beijing and held meetings with Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia. Both sides agreed to expand defense cooperation.
Earlier in May, the deputy interior ministers of both countries co-chaired a security committee meeting in Beijing. Afterward, Saudi Deputy Minister Abdulaziz bin Mohammed bin Ayaf said that the cooperation was “built on mutual trust and friendly relations between the two nations.”
During Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Bandar Alkhorayef’s visit to China last month, three memoranda of understanding were signed with Avic International, Lanshi Superalloy, and BMGK. These agreements are expected to support the development of Saudi Arabia’s domestic aerospace and defense industries.
Despite the presence of U.S. airbases, Riyadh realized after Israel’s attack on Doha last September that American security guarantees are not always reliable. Since then, Saudi Arabia has shown increasing interest in diversifying its security partnerships.
Against this backdrop, on September 17, Riyadh signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Pakistan, stating that an attack on one country would be considered an attack on the other.
However, this does not signal a departure from the United States but rather reflects Saudi Arabia’s strategy of building a multilateral security network. Pakistan’s nuclear capability also provides Riyadh with an additional layer of security assurance.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2010 and 2020, Saudi Arabia imported $245 million worth of arms from China, compared to over $15 billion from the United States. Between 2018 and 2022, 78% of Saudi arms imports came from U.S. sources.
Nevertheless, as part of its Vision 2030 initiative, Saudi Arabia aims to produce at least 50% of its defense spending domestically. To achieve that, it needs strategic partners capable of providing technology, materials, and technical expertise — and Riyadh increasingly views China as a suitable partner in this regard.
In 2021, a U.S. intelligence report claimed that Saudi Arabia was developing ballistic missiles with Chinese assistance — a sign of the deepening cooperation between the two nations.
Saudi Arabia still considers the United States its principal security partner, but it is not ignoring China. The recent regional instability, especially after the Doha attack, has made it clear to Riyadh that relying on a single security source is risky.
This situation presents an opportunity for China to strengthen its position in Saudi Arabia’s defense planning. Through collaboration in production, technology, and training, Beijing is becoming an indispensable part of Saudi Arabia’s security architecture — not as a primary guarantor but as a supportive strategic partner.
