Since the fall of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government in August 2024, Bangladesh has witnessed the troubling resurgence of Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh (HTB), a banned Islamist group long regarded as a destabilizing force in the country’s political landscape.
Exploiting the disarray of the Yunus-led interim government, HTB has reemerged from the shadows—campaigning openly for legalization, hosting seminars, and mobilizing thousands of followers under the banner of restoring a caliphate.
Expressing concern, freedom fighter Tajul Imam told The Voice: “The interim government led by Muhammad Yunus is apparently being tolerant towards radical Islamists. Militant organizations are growing with the government’s patronage. Many militants have been released. On the other hand, the Awami League, which led the Liberation War of Bangladesh, and other non-communal political parties and organizations are not being allowed to carry out political and social activities. The void in secular politics and social activities is being filled through the growth of extremism.”
He added: “If Islamic extremists or Hizb members are arrested, they can easily secure bail. Yet the Yunus government has detained secular politicians, teachers, artists, writers, journalists, and other prominent figures in absurd cases.”
From University Campuses to the Ranks of Power
Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 as a global movement advocating for a unified Islamic caliphate. Its Bangladesh chapter took shape in the early 2000s, spearheaded by teachers at Dhaka and Rajshahi universities.
The group quickly found fertile ground in elite institutions such as BUET and North South University, targeting high-achieving students disillusioned with secularism. By 2009, however, Sheikh Hasina’s government banned the group, citing threats to public order and national security.
Despite the proscription, HTB persisted underground, operating through study circles, online forums, and infiltration of professional networks—including the military. In 2012, the army exposed a foiled coup attempt involving HTB-linked officers. Over the following decade, the group’s ideology became a pipeline into more violent extremist networks, with members joining al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates.
Resurgence Under Interim Governance
The collapse of Hasina’s administration and the ensuing political vacuum opened unprecedented space for HTB. Within days of her ouster in August 2024, the group staged demonstrations at the National Parliament and Dhaka University’s Raju Memorial Sculpture, distributing leaflets and unfurling caliphate banners.
Posters soon appeared even at Gulshan Police Station, once the site of memorials for officers slain in the 2016 Islamic State-claimed Holey Artisan Bakery attack.
HTB’s activities expanded rapidly. Seminars thinly veiled as academic discussions promoted anti-Indian narratives and caliphate advocacy.
High-profile events, including the “March for Khilafot” in March 2025, drew over 3,000 supporters to Dhaka’s Baitul Mokkaram mosque, culminating in clashes with police that left dozens injured and more than 30 arrested. Despite occasional crackdowns, the group demonstrated its ability to mobilize at scale in the heart of the capital.
Penetrating Institutions
What makes HTB’s resurgence particularly alarming is its reach into elite and sensitive sectors. Intelligence reports suggest hundreds of trained members remain unaccounted for following mass prison breaks during the 2024 uprising.
Sympathizers are believed to occupy senior bureaucratic and even interim government posts. The organization has expanded into female cells targeting high school and college students, while some members have successfully embedded themselves in administrative and political networks.
An investigative report in Bangla Outlook alleged that Dhaka City-North’s administrator, Mohammad Azaz—appointed by the Yunus government—was a former HTB leader. Though he denied the accusations, the claims reinforced suspicions of institutional infiltration.
The interim government’s own police commissioner in Dhaka even declared publicly that “terrorists do not exist in Bangladesh,” a statement widely criticized by security experts.
Authorities, however, admit to having lost track of over 700 HTB operatives and nearly 200 convicted militants after last year’s prison breaks.
Security analysts warn that HTB is distinct from other extremist organizations in its recruitment of “intelligent and talented youth” capable of long-term influence in academia, governance, and the armed forces.
Without a coherent strategy that balances security with respect for civil liberties, Bangladesh risks both emboldening extremists and repeating the mistakes of authoritarian counterterrorism.
The group’s survival and growing appeal underscore the fragility of Bangladesh’s political environment. As the interim government struggles to maintain legitimacy and control, HTB has turned the gray zone between politics and extremism into a launchpad for its most ambitious bid yet: mainstreaming its vision of a caliphate in one of the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracies.
